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*Econornist,  Research  Departmen!,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Dallas.  The  views
expressed  in  this  paper  are  those  of  the  author  and  do  not  reflect  the  views
of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Dallas  or  the  Federal  Reserve  System.The question  of government  solvency  has  received  a lot of attention  in recent  years
especially  with the large U.S. fiscal deficits and the fiscal distress  suffered  by Iatin  American
governments  since  the onset  of the "debt crisis"  in the beginning  of the 1980s. Feliz and
Torres (1991)  test  whether  the dynarnic  government  budget  constraint  of Mexico  is binding
for the period 1981  to 1988.  They  find that intertemporal  budget  balance  was  violated  over
this  period. The methodolory  is based  upon  the stochastic  characteristics  of the components
ofthe budget  constraint. Briefly,  if we assume  interest  rate parity and  that, on average,  the
exchange  rate follows the domestic rate of  inflation, the dymamic  govemment budget
constraint  ist
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where  D, is (domestic  plus  foreign) government  debt,  M, is monetary  base,  G, is the totality
of government spending,  T, is the totality of government non-borrowed revenues,  z',' is the
expected  rate of inflation, and p, is the average  real rate of interest  on government  debt.
I€t  the real level of debt be d,,  the real primary government  deficit be 6,, and the
real value of seignorage  be o,*, = AM-,/P,-,.  Equation (1) can  be rewritten as
'The model  follows  the discussion  of Welch,  Primo Braga,  and  Andr€ (1987)  and  Trehan
and Walsh (1988).dnr=  6, + (l  + p)d, -  or-,
Suppose  the time series  vector  &  = [5, d,,  q.J  is first difference  stationary. By the
WoId decomposition  theorenl X, can  be represented
(l  - L)x. = I  + C(tr)vr
where C(L) is a 3 x 3 matrix in the lag operator,  l, is a drift term, and vr is a vector  white
noise  process  with v, = [v,,,,  !rr, !r.,], We can  form the inclusive  of debt  interest  goverument
deficit by multiplyrng  {  by the cointegrating  vector  B' = [1, p, -U. This  lelds  the following
expression
6  - L)FtXt  = pI), + BtC(Llv, (4)
One can  use  equation  (4) to rationally  forecast  the  value  of future government  debt.
Substituting  equation  (4) into equation  (2) and iterating  forward,  one finds the solution  to
the value of  d,.  As  Trehan and Walsh (1991) show, equation (4)  implies that  if
intertemporal budgets  are satisfied  (no bubbles),  real government  debt will  follow the
following process'
This particular  solution  assumes  a constant  real interest  rate. The test  below  are  based
upon an extension  by Trehan and Walsh (1991)  to va  able real interest  rates.
(2)
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where  D(L)v, is stationary.  Equation  (5) implies  that for dynamic  budget  balance  to obtain,
the primary deficit,  the stock  of intemal debt,  the stock  of foreign debt,  and  seignorage  are
cointegrated  with cointegrating  vector  B' = [1, p,,  -1]. Feliz and  Torres  (1991)  choose  to test
for government  insolvency  by testing  whether  such  cointegration  exists.  Unfortunately,  this
approach  suffers  from two severe  limitations. The first is that one  must  assume  that the real
interest rate  on  government debt  is  constant.  Secondly,  the  test  necessitates  the
measurement  of real seignorage  which  is problematic  at best. I will discuss  this  issue  further
below.
A better approach  is to perform an equivalent  test  which looks at the stationarity  of
the first difference  of the real government  debt which,  from equation  (5) is equal to the
cointegration  relationship  between  the primary deficit, the level of real debt, and reai
seignorage  or, in  other words, the deficit inclusive  of interest payments.3 If  the first
difference  of real debt is stationary,  budget  balance  holds. Table L shows  the results  of
augmented  Dickey-Fuller  and Phillips-Penon  tests  of stationarity  using  Feliz and Torres'
data  on real government  debt in Mexico. All tests  significantly  reject  the null hypothesis  of
non-stationary  first differences  of real debt, Hence,  the evidence  strongly  indicates  that
oTrehan  and Walsh (1991) extend  their results  of (1988)  to the case  where the real
interest  rate on government  debt is not constant,  as  in this case. Their results  show  that if
p, is a stochastic  process  bound strictly below by tr">O  in expected  value and (l-L)d, is a
stationary  process,  then intertemporal  budget  balance  is satisfied. Real interest rates  on
internal govemment  debt were positive  in both Argentina and Brazil over the period.Table 1
Mexico:  Tests  of a Unit Root and Time Trend 1986:3-1990:2
Real Internal Government  Debt
a. Null Hypothesis:  Variable has  a Unit Root (with time trend)
b: Null Hypothesis:  Variable has  Unit Root (with no time trend)





Areal government debta) -lJ-  /J
Notes:  (a)  One lag was  used  in these  tests  of stationarity. The lag structure  was
chosen  by adding  lags  until the Q(22) statistic  did not reject the null
hypothesis  of autocorelated residuals.
(b)  Variable significantly  violates  normality assumption  either because  of
skewness  or kurtosis  using the tests  developed  in Jarque and Bera
(1980).
I  signifies  significance  at the a=0.10 level, **  signifies  significance  at the
a=0.05 level,  and *i*  signifies  significance  at the a=0.01 level.





Areal government  debt@) -14.03"'intertemporal budget balance was maintained over this period.
What accounts  for the discrepancy  of between these findings and those of Feliz and
Torres (1991)? As discussed  in Welch, Primo Braga,  and Andr6 (1987)  and Cukierman
(1988),  simple  disffete measurement  of seignorage  generates  a biased  measure  of the real
resource  flow from money  creation  as  money  growth  is more or less  a continuous  process.




where variables are defined as above and the dot
derivative. Note that
represents  an instantaneous  time
Mt  = Moevt
where  p now represents  the instantaneous  rate of nominal money  growth.a  Hence
M, = pMoe\t
Equation 5 now becomes
aThe  instantaneous  rate of growth  of money,  &, can  be approximated  by ln(1+p') where
p' is the discrete  time rate of growth. Note that for the period of time selected,  money
srowth is assumed  constant.
(7)
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where r  is the instantaneous  rate of inflation.s
Integrating  equation  (5) from t to t+ 1 yields
,r.,  ='.i,u*  =  #+,r(p-'{e(p-') 
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On the other hand,  discrete  time measurement  of seignorage  gives
(10)
Subtracting  equations  (9)  from  (10)  yields  an  expression  for the  bias  inherent  in Feliz
and  Torres'  measure  of seigniorage
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sThe  instantaneous  inllation rate can  be approximated  in a similar fashion  as  described
in footnote 3.This non-linear  bias  becomes  larger  the larger  the money  growth  rate and  the iarger
the divergence of inflation  from  the money growth rate.  A  Taylor series expansion also
shows that  the bias can reverse sign depending upon  the  relative  difference between
inflation  and  money  $owth.
In summary,  the conclusion  of this comment  is that somehow  seignorage  (and the
other parts  of the interest  inclusive  deficit) behaves  to keep dynamic  budget  balance. This
conclusion  also  holds  for Argentina  and Brazil, countries  which have  an historical  inflation
rate much higher than Mexico's  and consequently  have a smaller monetary  base [Welch
1991].  The major problem  in I-atin  American  countries  in a long term framework,  however,
remains to shift from monetary financed deficits to tax financed deficits.  Fortunately,
Mexico seems  to have  crossed  this hurdle.
7I would like to thank Shenryi  Guo for careful  research  assistance  and Raril A. Feliz for his
comments  and for providing me with his data.  Of  course,  any remaining errors and
omissions  are  the responsibility  of the author. The views  expressed  in this article are those
of the authors  and should  not be attributed to the Federal  Reserve  Bank of Dallas or the
Federal  Reserve  System.
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